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WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
AND TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS:
SHOULD THE "AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION" BE REDRAWN?
By John Heisse*
Introduction
Traditionally, "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, [were] per se unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."' When one of these ex-
ceptions existed, however, the permissible scope of a search could be
quite broad. Indeed, prior to 1969, if a suspect was arrested while at
home, his entire premises could be searched for evidence of the alleged
criminal activity.2
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Chime? v. Calfornia.' In Chimel, the Court limited searches incident to
arrests to the area within the immediate control of the suspect, from
which the suspect could grab a weapon or destructible evidence. As a
result of Chimel, any police search beyond this limited area must now
be independently authorized through the procurement of a search war-
rant.
* B.E., 1976, Catholic University of America; member, third year class.
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The excepted searches included
searches incident to valid arrests, pat-down searches of suspects, searches of automobiles,
searches of buildings while in "hot pursuit," emergency searches for injured persons,
searches and seizures of objects in plain view, and consensual searches.
2. Prior to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court upheld, when incident
to a valid arrest, searches of areas within the possession or under the control of the person
arrested. Thus, a thorough search of an entire four room apartment following an arrest was
sustained as incident to the arrest. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Similarly,
the Court upheld a one and one-half hour search of an office as incident to arrest, stating
that the test for the validity of such a search "is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 66 (1950). In spite of the Court's positive assertion in Rabinowitz, however, the
permissible scope of searches incident to arrests was far from clear until the definitive word
was handed down in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Chimel decision pro-
vides an instructive historical review of the Court's inconsistent decisions on the scope of
searches incident to arrests. Id at 755-65.
3. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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The restrictions imposed by Chimel severely hamstrung police in
their efforts to obtain important evidence lawfully, because the pro-
curement of the necessary search warrant often involved lengthy de-
lays, making a legal search of the premises impracticable.' In an effort
to alleviate some of these additional burdens, and at the same time
comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court, the California Legis-
lature in 1970 enacted Penal Code sections 1526(b)5 and 1528(b).6
These statutes effectively allow a police officer to obtain a search war-
rant while remaining on the scene of the crime.
Section 1526(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[in lieu of a writ-
ten affidavit. . . the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath
which shall be recorded and transcribed." Once transcribed, the state-
ment shall serve as the affidavit on the face of which any subsequent
challenges to the warrant are weighed.7 Section 1528(b) permits the
magistrate to "orally authorize a police officer to sign the magistrate's
name on a duplicate original warrant. . . ," thus enabling a warrant to
be obtained without a face-to-face meeting of the magistrate and his
affiant. The duplicate original warrant serves as the official search war-
rant which is then executed and returned by the peace officer. The
magistrate records the time of issuance on the original warrant, which
is filed with the duplicate after it is returned by the officer. In this way
the officer may effectively search pursuant to a valid warrant in cases
where he formerly would have been compelled to conduct a warrant-
less search or refrain from searching altogether. Arizona adopted simi-
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1525 (West Supp. 1979) requires that a search warrant be is-
sued only upon probable cause supported by affidavit. Thus, in order to obtain a search
warrant, officers were required to post a guard on the premises, consult the district attorney,
prepare a written affidavit and visit a magistrate for issuance of the warrant.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526(b) (West Supp. 1979) states: "In lieu of the written affida-
vit required in subdivision (a), the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath which
shall be recorded and transcribed. The transcribed statement shall be deemed to be an affi-
davit for the purposes of this chapter. In such cases, the recording of the sworn oral state-
ment and the transcribed statement shall be certified by the magistrate receiving it and shall
be filed with the clerk of the court. In the alternative in such cases, the sworn oral statement
shall be recorded by a certified court reporter and the transcript of the statement shall be
certified by the reporter, after which the magistrate receiving it shall certify the transcript
which shall be filed with the clerk of the court."
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528(b) (West Supp. 1979) states: "The magistrate may orally
authorize a peace officer to sign the magistrate's name on a duplicate original warrant. A
duplicate original warrant shall be deemed to be a search warrant for the purposes of this
chapter, and it shall be returned to the magistrate as provided for in Section 1537. In such
cases, the magistrate shall enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time of the
issuance of the warrant and shall sign and file the original warrant and the duplicate original
warrant with the clerk of the court as provided for in Section 1541."
7. The requirement of affidavits supporting the existence of probable cause is a crea-
ture of statute; the Fourth Amendment itself does not require that probable cause be estab-
lished by affidavit. United States v. Mendel, 578 F.2d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 964 (1978).
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lar statutes in 1971,8 and in 1977 the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were amended to allow for such a procedure.9
The warrants provided for in Penal Code sections 1526(b) and
1528(b) are commonly referred to as "telephonic search warrants"
(TSWs). If used effectively, the TSW procedure can greatly reduce the
time lag inherent in the acquisition of a search warrant,10 because the
police officer no longer needs to appear personally before the magis-
trate with a written affidavit." The officer may now remain on the
scene of the intended investigation and communicate with the magis-
trate by radio or telephone. In addition, the acquisition of search war-
rants is streamlined by allowing the clerical task of transcribing the oral
statement to take place after the warrant has been issued.' 2
Through the use of TSWs, officers may now search pursuant to
valid warrants in instances where formerly only warrantless searches
could be conducted. The advantages of a search pursuant to a TSW
over a warrantless search are threefold: first, the intervention of a neu-
tral and detached magistrate enables probable cause determinations to
be made prior to the search rather than relying on an after-the-fact
judgment."' Second, the use of oral affidavits allows the officer's prob-
able cause statement to be effectively "frozen" prior to the search, again
dispensing with the need to rely on hindsight. Third, since a search
8. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3914(C), 13-3915(C) (1978). These sections were
adopted from CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1526(b) (West) and 1528(b) (West), respectively and
therefore closely parallel the California legislation.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2). Comparable amendments are under consideration in
otherjurisdictions. See Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan
Proposals, 73 MICH. L. REV. 221, 258-63 (1974); Nakell, Proposed Revisions ofNorth Caro-
lina's Search and Seizure Law, 52 N.C.L. REV. 277, 306-11 (1973). In addition, it has been
strongly recommended that "every State enact legislation that provides for the issuance of
search warrants pursuant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police officers." NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT
ON POLICE 95 (1973).
10. According to one commentator, the San Diego District Attorney's Office estimated
that 95 percent of the TSWs take less than 45 minutes to obtain. See Comment, Oral Search
Warrants: .4 New Standard of Warrant .4vailabiliy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 691, 694 n.23
(1973).
11. People v. Aguirre, 26 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 10, 103 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (1972). See
notes 33-36 and accompanying text infra.
12. People v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d 993, 998, 113 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (1974). See note
39 and accompanying text infra.
13. "By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
'be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive author-
ity. See McDonald v United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948)." Arkansas v. Sanders, 99
S. Ct. 2586, 2590 (1979).
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pursuant to a valid warrant carries with it a presumption of legality, ' 4
the prosecution no longer need bear the burden of proving the ade-
quacy of the probable cause. Additionally, there are advantages to the
use of oral affidavits over written ones:
[o]ral testimony before the magistrate will often be more likely
• . . to assure that the magistrate will make an independent judg-
ment based on the facts and not rely on the mere conclusions of
the officer . . . [and] oral presentation makes it possible for the
magistrate to explore any points not adequately covered or left
ambiguous by the witness' statement.' 5
Unfortunately, however, the use of TSWs in California has been
limited at best; only in San Diego is the procedure regularly em-
ployed. 6 The reasons for this reluctance include the unwillingness of
many magistrates to have their probable cause determinations recorded
verbatim, the inexperience of police officers with the drafting and use
of affidavits, especially in urgent situations, and, arguably, the peace
officer's realization that hindsight is often more forgiving than fore-
sight.' 7
Clearly, the TSW procedure is not without drawbacks; in dispens-
ing with the face-to-face meetings between magistrate and affiant, the
procedure has dispensed with demeanor evidence at the application
stage of the warrant process.' 8 The procedure has also opened up the
possibility of having an oral transmission misunderstood, leading to the
preparation of a written transcription which does not accurately reflect
the reporting officer's statement.' 9 Finally, the absence of a written rec-
14. Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 101,501 P.2d 234, 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226,
243 (1972).
15. United States v. Mendel, 578 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1978).
16. Because the federal TSW statutes only became effective on October 1, 1977, little
case law exists regarding their use by federal officers. It should be noted, however, that the
federal statute requires the magistrate to determine that the "circumstances make it reason-
able to dispense with a written affidavit" before the oral procedure can be used. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A). Once this decision is made, failure to use a written affidavit cannot be
the grounds of a motion to suppress, absent a finding of bad faith. Id. 41(c)(2)(G).
17. Limitations on the use of TSWs are often a matter of policy. For example, in Los
Angeles County, TSWs are used only in emergency situations. R.J. CHRYSTIE & R. SCHiRN,
SEARCH WARRANTS: A MANUAL IX-1 (1977) (Publication of the California District Attor-
neys Association and the Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office). Similarly, TSWs
are used in San Diego only (1) during non-business hours, court holidays, nighttime or
weekends, (2) in emergencies (where the evidence may be immediately destroyed), and (3)
where premises have been secured and the officers need to conduct a search. BELL, TELE-
PHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS 13. These restrictions are self-imposed and not the result of
legislative or judicial intervention.
18. It is questionable how much weight magistrates actually give to demeanor evidence,
and how much weight should be given to this evidence. Police officers are accustomed to the
warrant application procedure, and it is therefore unlikely that their demeanor will be a true
index of their credibility. See Comment, supra note 10, at 701-03.
19. This danger can be minimized, however, if the oral affidavit is recorded and pre-
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ord regarding the issuance of the warrant may hamper the ability of a
magistrate to properly determine the existence of probable cause in cer-
tain complex situations.2"
But whatever the motivation behind resistance to the use of TSWs,
their rapid availability may result in serious Fourth Amendment impli-
cations. It is the aim of this note to examine the constitutional implica-
tions of using TSWs in one of the areas where search warrants are not
generally required: in the search of automobiles. 2 This writer does
not envision an abandonment of traditional warrants in favor of the
TSW; indeed, the disadvantages previously recited indicate the dangers
such a development would entail. It is suggested, however, that while
exigent circumstances by definition preclude the procurement of tradi-
tional search warrants, the rapid availability of TSWs allows for the
protection of Fourth Amendment interests in all but the most immedi-
ate of exigencies. As stated by one commentator, "rapid availability of
a warrant could mean that some search situations now considered suffi-
ciently exigent to justify dispensing with a warrant-such as some
searches of mobile vehicles-might no longer carry their emergency
character. As a result, the reason for excusing the failure to obtain a
search warrant in those situations would no longer exist."'22 In light of
the TSW procedure now available, the limits of the exigent circum-
stance exception to the search warrant requirement must be redrawn.
Although there are other exceptions to the search warrant require-
ment which are based on the existence of exigent circumstances, such
as the warrantless pat-down search of a suspect conducted for the pro-
tection of the officer and of destructible evidence, warrantless searches
of buildings by officers in "hot pursuit" of one or more suspects, and
emergency searches of crime scenes conducted to ensure that injured
parties will be discovered and cared for, the patent immediacy of these
exceptions demonstrates the absurdity of any delay in the procurement
of a warrant, no matter how short.
This note will examine the possible implications of the availability
of TSWs on the automobile exception by studying each of the three
justifications for a warrantless search of an automobile: the "Carroll
served on a tape so that any apparent discrepancies can be checked. If electronic recording
facilities are not available, and time permits, a stenographic or longhand record can be made
and read back to the officer. Clearly, an electronic recording provides the best protection
against inaccurate transcripts.
20. The complexity of an affidavit is determined, inter alia, by the description of the
area to be searched, the nature of the items to be seized, the basis of the affiant's knowledge,
whether an informer is being used, and the nature of the search and seizure. In most cases
complex warrant applications are the result of extended investigations, where the use of oral
affidavits is seldom an indispensable factor. Comment, .supra note 10, at 703-05.
21. Although this exception is commonly referred to as the "automobile exception," it
generally applies to all motor vehicles.
22. Nakell, supra note 9, at 311.
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Doctrine," the plain view exception, and the search incident to an ar-
rest doctrine. The discussion will commence with an analysis of the
mechanics of TSWs and an examination of judicial interpretations of
the TSW statutes. Each of the three justifications will then be analyzed
under both federal and California jurisprudence, and finally, the
ramifications of TSWs will be explored.
I. The Mechanics of the TSW
The procedure for obtaining a TSW closely resembles that re-
quired for acquiring a traditional warrant. There are, however, three
differences, relating to the oral nature of the affidavit,2 3 the lack of a
requirement that the affiant be in the presence of a magistrate, and the
use of the duplicate original search warrant.24
In the telephonic procedure, the officer contacts the magistrate
who activates a recording device.2 5 The magistrate immediately places
his affiant under oath and the affiant recites the probable cause in sup-
port of the search warrant. In the event the magistrate does not find
sufficient probable cause in the officer's statement, he may question the
officer until satisfied that probable cause does, indeed, exist. Once this
determination is made by the magistrate, he states that sufficient proba-
ble cause exists for the issuance of a warrant. The affiant then proceeds
to read his proposed duplicate original warrant, prepared beforehand,
to the magistrate. A duplicate original warrant is the search warrant
form filled out and executed by the officer. Its use allows the officer to
serve and execute a search warrant without going to the magistrate for
23. Several states allow the use of oral testimony to supplement or supplant a written
record. See, e.g., Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971) (Arkansas); United States
v. Berkus, 428 F.2d 1148, 1150-52 (8th Cir. 1970) (Minnesota); Pennsylvania ex rel Fieling
v. Sincavage, 313 F. Supp. 967, 970 (W.D. Pa. 1970), a 'd, 439 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1971)
(Pennsylvania); Naples v. Maxwell, 271 F. Supp. 850, 854 (S.D. Ohio 1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1080 (1969) (Ohio).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528(b) (West Supp. 1979).
25. The federal statute appears to require that the magistrate make the recording, the
Arizona and California laws do not. In Los Angeles County, the district attorney's office
records the oral affidavit, prepares the written transcript, and has the issuing magistrate cer-
tify the written record. See R.J. CHRYSTIE & R. SCHIRN, supra note 17, at IX, 1-4. In
Alameda and Sari Diego counties, the magistrate (or a certified court reporter) records and
oversees the affidavit's transcription, and certifies its accuracy. See Jensen, The Oral Search
Warrant, 1 POINT OF VIEW 6 (1970) (Publication of the Alameda County District Attorney's
Office).
The California and federal statutes favor the use of electronic voice recording devices,
but if none is available, the California statute requires the use of a certified reporter while
the federal statute requires only a stenographic or longhand record. The Arizona law re-
quires that the statement "be recorded on tape, wire, or other comparable method." It
makes no mention of an alternate means of recording the affidavit. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3914(c).
his signature.26 If changes are required, both the original warrant and
the duplicate original warrant are changed in the identical manner.27
The magistrate then states that the search warrant, as read by the affi-
ant, shall issue, and recites the time of day of its issuance to prevent the
officer from making a search which precedes the warrant's issuance.28
The magistrate must also state that he is authorizing the affiant to sign
his name to the duplicate original search warrant.29 At this point, the
officer may so sign and execute the warrant. As soon as possible after
the search the duplicate original warrant is taken to the magistrate for
his signature and the recording thereon of the time of its issuance. The
recording of the magistrate-affiant conversation is transcribed and both
the tape and transcription are certified by the magistrate and filed with
the clerk of the court,30 along with the original warrant, the duplicate
original warrant and the return to the search warrant.3 ' It is upon this
record that the merit of any subsequent challenge to the validity of the
search warrant is determined.32
A. Judicial Interpretations
The first appellate-level interpretation of the TSW took place in
1972 in People v. Aguire.33 The Aguire court interpreted Penal Code
section 1526 as not requiring a face-to-face meeting between the affiant
and magistrate. Instead, the court suggested that the oral affidavit
could be transmitted to the magistrate "by means of telephones, two-
way radios or face-to-face communication",34 provided that the com-
munication is recorded. 5 The court of appeal also held that it was not
prejudicial error for the magistrate to administer the oath to his affiant
following the statement rather than at the start.3 6
26. See note 6 supra.
27. Although the affidavit may be oral, the warrant must be written. The officer must
present a written search warrant at the time of his search. Bowyer v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 151, 165, 111 Cal. Rptr. 628, 637 (1974). See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
28. Without the required time notations an officer could complete the duplicate warrant
without prior judicial approval, and then apply for the warrant after the search had been
completed. This would be a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. For this reason,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1534(b) (West Supp. 1979) states: "If a duplicate original search war-
rant has been executed, the peace officer who executed the warrant shall enter the exact time
of its execution on its face."
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1528(b) (West Supp. 1979).
30. Id § 1526(b).
31. Id § 1528(b).
32. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
33. 26 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1972).
34. Id at 10, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
35. Id at 11, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
36. Id A federal court held that the failure to administer the oath prior to the state-
ment was reversible error because the immediate administration of the oath impresses the
affiant with the importance of his statement. United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.
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The constitutionality of TSWs was upheld by the California Court
of Appeal in 1974 in People v. Peck.37 In the same year, the California
Supreme Court held that when a TSW is challenged, the sufficiency of
probable cause must be determined by examining only that testimony
which was recorded and transcribed.38 However, the actual transcrip-
tion of the oral testimony need not take place prior to the execution of
the search warrant.39 Thus, considerable tifine may be saved through
the use of oral affidavits, even in non-exigent situations. 40 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal has held that the warrant itself must be in written
form, however.4'
California courts have ruled that there is neither a prerequisite of
exigent circumstances for a TSW to be used,4 z nor a requirement that
the procedure be resorted to where a TSW can be practically ob-
tained.43 In People v. Smith,' for example, the court justified a war-
rantless search by exigency, even though it recognized that the officer
could have obtained a TSW, as he had "almost an hour to wait."
45
Though there is substantial case law supporting judicial reluctance to-
wards requiring the use of a TSW whenever practicable, this case law
antedates the TSW statutes and must be re-examined in light of these
statutes.
1979). Arizona courts have yet to decide whether the oath must be given prior to the state-
ment. They have, however, held that failure to record the oath is not reversible error so long
as the statement itself is recorded. State v. Mead, 120 Ariz. 108, 110, 584 P.2d 572, 574
(1978).
37. 38 Cal. App. 3d 993, 113 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1974).
38. People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 759-760 n.29, 528 P.2d 1, 22-23 n.29, 117 Cal. Rptr.
393, 414-15 n.29 (1974). The Arizona Supreme Court ruled similarly in State v. Robertson,
Ill Ariz. 427, 428, 531 P.2d 1134, 1135 (1975). However, in United States v. Turner, 558
F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit left open the question of whether the record-
ing and transcribing of oral testimony is constitutionally required.
39. People v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 809. A federal court re-
cently ruled in accord with Peck on this point, stating "[i]t is inconceivable that such a time-
consuming, cumbersome, and pointless procedure was intended, especially in view of the
likelihood that time will be of the essence when a search warrant is being sought." United
States v. Mendel, 578 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1978).
40. Although TSWs are not restricted to emergency situations as a matter of law, People
v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 810, as a matter of policy they often are so
restricted. See note 17 supra.
41. Bowyer v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
42. People v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
43. In State v. Million, 120 Az. 10, 15-16, 583 P.2d 897, 902-03 (1978), the Arizona
Supreme Court refused to invalidate a warrantless search on the ground, inter ala, that a
TSW could have been obtained, citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). See Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); notes 74 & 92-109 and accompanying text infra. See
also State v. Million, 27 Ariz. App. 490, 556 P.2d 338 (1976).
44. 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
45. Id at 648, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
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II. The Automobile Exception
A. The Carroll Doctrine
The automobile exception originated in Carroll v. United States,"
a case involving the warrantless search of an automobile suspected of
being used to transport alcohol in violation of the National Prohibition
Act. In Carroll, the defendants, who were known to the arresting of-
ficers as dealers in illegal whiskey, were seen driving along their cus-
tomary smuggling route in a car which they were known to have used
in their illicit enterprise. After stopping the suspects, the officers con-
ducted an immediate warrantless search of the defendants' car which
revealed some 68 bottles of contraband whiskey.
The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the Carroll search
and seizure, carved out an exception to the search warrant requirement.
Simply stated, the exception applies whenever police have probable
cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, and also
have reason to believe that the vehicle and/or the evidence may be
removed before a warrant can be obtained. If both of these factors are
present, the officers may search the vehicle without a warrant.
. Probable Cause
Not only does probable cause allow a warrantless search to be con-
ducted, it also determines the permissible scope of such a search. Cali-
fornia courts, in dealing with the automobile exception, have defined
the requisite probable cause as existing "when an officer is aware of
facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe,
and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of
the search is in the particular place to be searched."47 Thus, in some
cases, only a partial search of the vehicle will be justified, while in
others, the probable cause may extend to the car as a whole. "[T]here is
a recognized and protectible privacy interest in concealed areas of a
car, and the search of a car like all other searches must be properly
circumscribed to be 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment .. ,,4" Therefore, when the police have probable cause
to search only the passenger compartment of a vehicle, this license does
not automatically extend to the trunk4 9 or glove compartment of the
car.
50
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
47. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 885, 512 P.2d 1208, 1218, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314
(1973); Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 571, 547 P.2d 417, 526-27, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 650-51 (1976).
48. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d at 571, 547 P.2d at 426, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
650.
49. d
50. Although a warrantless search of the glove compartment of a locked automobile
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The probable cause requirement for a valid warrantless search is
the same as that required for obtaining a written search warrant.51
Thus, the use of TSWs in automobile stops and searches introduces an
effective check on the sufficiency of the probable cause prior to the
search.
2. Exigency
The second requisite of a lawful warrantless automobile search is
the existence of exigent circumstances5 2 such that the procurement of a
search warrant is "an impossible or impractical alternative."53 The
Carroll Court indicated that the requisite exigency did not exist where
the officer could practicably secure a warrant prior to the search: "[iun
the cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used. . .... " In the years following Carroll, this standard was
reaffirmed in several cases, including Trupiano v. United States.55 The
Trupiano Court held that when a search warrant could have been ob-
tained but was not, the evidence seized in the warrantless search had to
be excluded as evidence tainted by an unreasonable search. 6 Trupiano
involved a raid on an illegal distillery by government agents following
several weeks of observation and infiltration of the criminal enterprise.
The nighttime raid resulted in several arrests and a thorough warrant-
less search of the premises, under circumstances where a "warrant
could easily have been obtained."57 The Court found the searches un-
constitutional, reasoning that "law enforcement agents must secure and
was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976), the search in that case was not an investigatory search, but a routine inventory
search. The Court stated that "[t]he probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly
when no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investi-
gations." Id at 370 n.5. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and White,
Justice Marshall vehemently condemned the plurality decision, arguing that "the Constitu-
tion does not permit such searches as a matter of routine; absent specific consent, such a
search is permissible only in exceptional circumstances of particular necessity." Id at 392.
51. The Carroll Doctrine focuses on the presence of probable cause to search, and not
on the mere presence of an automobile. "Automobile or no automobile, there must be prob-
able cause." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973).
52. Briefly stated, exigent circumstances exist "[wlhere it is not practicable to secure a
warrant to search a vehicle for contraband goods because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction. [In such a case] the vehicle may be searched by a proper
official then having probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains such goods." Travis
v. United States, 362 F.2d 477, 480-81 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966).
53. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d at 884, 512 P.2d at 1218, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
54. 267 U.S. at 156.
55. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
56. Id at 705-10.
57. Id at 704.
1040
use search warrants whenever reasonably practicable.""8 Reiterating
their statement from Johnson v. United States,59 the Court argued that
"[n]o reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the
inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare
papers and present evidence to a magistrate. These are never very con-
vincing reasons. - 0
The requisites of a valid warrantless search were revised in 1950
when the "reasonable practicability" language of Trupiano was over-
ruled. The Court, in Rabinowitz v. United States,6 felt it "fallacious to
judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the
time element alone, that there was time to procure a search war-
rant ... 62 In Rabinowitz, officers executed an arrest warrant on the
defendant who was charged with selling, possessing and concealing
forged and altered government obligations with the intent to defraud.
After arresting the defendant in his office, the police searched the office
for approximately one and one-half hours without a warrant. The
Court upheld the search as being incident to a lawful arrest,6 but in
doing so had to overrule the Trupiano language regarding the securing
of search warrants whenever reasonably practicable. That it was feasi-
ble to secure a warrant in this case was evident from the fact that the
officers had procured an arrest warrant prior to their arrival. In over-
ruling Trupiano, the Court reasoned that because a warrantless search
incident to arrest may be considered reasonable, the authority for such
a search must flow from the lawful custody of the suspect.' This being
so, the validity of warrantless searches must turn on their reasonable-
ness under all of the circumstances, and not solely on the practicability
of obtaining a search warrant.6 1 "The relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable. 66
Justices Black67 and Frankfurter" both dissented from the major-
ity decision in Rabinowitz, neither wishing to overrule Trupiano. In
Justice Frankfurter's dissent, joined by Justice Jackson, the history and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was traced. Justice Frankfurter
58. Id at 705.
59. 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
60. 334 U.S. at 706.
61. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
62. Id at 65.
63. The scope of the Rabinowitz search greatly exceeds that presently allowed in a
search incident to an arrest, as laid down in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See
note 72 and accompanying text infra.
64. 339 U.S. at 65-66.
65. Id
66. Id at 66.
67. Id
68. Id at 68.
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concluded that before the privacy rights protected by this amendment
could legally be infringed upon by a search, a determination of the
existence of probable cause must be made by a judicial officer, subject
only to a few necessary exceptions, and that "[t]he exceptions cannot be
enthroned in the rule."69 Frankfurter argued that the conduct of the
arresting officers prior to the arrest is no less relevant than their conduct
in making the arrest,70 and "[i]n any event. . . the presence or absence
of an ample opportunity for getting a search warrant becomes very im-
portant.
Analyzing Rabinowitz in light of more recent case law, it is inter-
esting to note that the scope of the Rabinowitz search greatly exceeded
that which the Court proscribed for searches incident to arrest in
Chimel v. California.72 In fact, it was as a result of Chimel that the first
TSW statutes were enacted, permitting precisely the type of search that
was undertaken in Rabinowitz. With the rapid availability of TSWs,
perhaps the time has come to abandon Rabinowitz and return to Trupi-
ano's practicability standard. However, despite procedural changes
which have arguably outmoded Rabinowitz, its holding is still in force.
The Court continues to focus on the reasonableness of the search.73
As evidence of the continuing validity of Rabinowitz, the Supreme
Court, in 1974, held that the failure to obtain a search warrant at the
first practicable moment would not invalidate a warrantless search, be-
cause "the exigency may arise at any time and the fact that the police
might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of
a current situation, necessitating prompt police action."7 4 Where, for
example, a suspect's vehicle is stopped while under surveillance, the
police are not required to attempt to obtain a search warrant. On the
other hand, the availability of TSWs may alter this rule.
3. TSWs and Carroll Searches
The rapid availability of the TSW significantly relaxes burden-
some police procedures that have traditionally accompanied the pro-
curement of a search warrant. Because the burden on police officers is
reduced, the protection afforded to personal liberties should be in-
creased accordingly. The existence of the TSW procedure will proba-
69. Id at 80.
70. Id at 84.
71. Id
72. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
73. Chimel actually overruled Rabinowitz with respect to searches incident to arrests.
Although it is not clear from Chimel how much of Rabinowitz was invalidated, the portion
pertinent here-the materiality of ample opportunity to get a warrant-was reiterated in
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), discussed in the next paragraph.
74. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974).
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bly lead to a redefinition of the meaning of exigency, perhaps resulting
in a return to the Trupiano "reasonable practicability" standard.
Measuring the exigency of a situation based on the officer's oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant appears to be particularly suited to the use of
TSWs, because TSWs can drastically reduce the time lag inherent in
the procurement of a search warrant. But even TSWs may involve
some delay, and when the situation confronting an officer is such that
even a short delay75 would be imprudent, a warrantless automobile
search could still be conducted.
TSWs can often be obtained during ongoing surveillance activi-
ties, as well as in automobile stop and search situations, with no appre-
ciable cost to effective law enforcement. The use of the TSW procedure
allows an officer not only to obtain a search warrant, but to simultane-
ously observe the suspect vehicle. Since officers maintain a supply of
search warrant forms in their vehicles, the acquisition of TSWs during
surveillance allows judicial intervention without endangering the ongo-
ing investigation. Indeed, if a situation necessitates action before the
TSW application is complete, the police can discontinue the applica-
tion procedure and search the automobile, relying on the Carroll Doc-
trine.
This is precisely what occurred in State v. Arellano,76 where police
had a parked automobile under surveillance in connection with a nar-
cotics investigation. While the officers were attempting to obtain a
TSW, the car was moved by the defendant and his accomplices, at
which point the officers stopped and thoroughly searched the vehicle
without a warrant.77 The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the search,
stating that the circumstances were exigent, and that the exigency was
not created by the officers, but rather was forced upon them. On the
other hand, where officers are able to obtain a TSW while maintaining
surveillance, the additional burden imposed by requiring TSW acquisi-
tion during surveillance is negligible and the burden is outweighed by
the desirability of protecting the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.
Under such circumstances the TSW procedure should, in the opinion
of this author, be obligatory.78
75. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text sufpra.
76. 110 Ariz. 434, 520 P.2d 306 (1974).
77. Id Although the opinion does not detail the extent of the search, it does note that
the confiscated marijuana was found in the trunk under the floorboard.
78. The Trupiano Court would probably have favored such a requirement. In dealing
with a warrantless search of an illegal distillery, the Supreme Court stated ". . . the property
was not of a type that could have been dismantled and removed before the agents had time
to secure a warrant; especially is this so since one of them was on hand at all times to report
and guard against such a move." 334 U.S. at 706. Had the Court envisioned a procedure
allowing the officer to procure a warrant while maintaining surveillance, they doubtlessly
would have espoused such a requirement.
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The TSW procedure would also significantly heighten the protec-
tion given personal liberties in the typical automobile stop and search.
In many, if not most, automobile stop situations, immediate action by
the investigating officer is not required. The officer can detain the sus-
pect and immobilize the suspect's vehicle while obtaining advance judi-
cial approval for a search. Admittedly, requiring the officer to obtain a
TSW in those situations would increase the administrative burden on
law enforcement,79 but the accompanying augmentation of constitu-
tional protections should outweigh this concern.8° Certainly constitu-
tional rights should not be sacrificed in deference to the alleviation of
ministerial tasks.
One objection to the TSW procedure is that the potentially inno-
cent suspect is delayed at the scene of the stop for the period of time
required for the warrant's acquisition. Typically, a stop and search sit-
uation involves the potential infringement of two of the suspect's inter-
ests: his interest in moving on, and his privacy interest in the contents
of his automobile." If the officer detains the suspect while obtaining a
TSW, the suspect's freedom of movement is restricted. On the other
hand, if a warrantless search is immediately made, the suspect's privacy
is invaded. One solution is to allow the suspect to select which of these
interests shall be compromised. He may either consent to a warrantless
search, thus minimizing any delay, or, if he values his privacy, he may
insist upon judicial intervention.8 2
It is well settled that where a suspect consents to a warrantless
search, the search is valid. 3 Purported consent alone is not sufficient,
however, since it must be established that the consent was freely given
79. For example, if police were required to obtain TSWs for routine automobile
searches, the influx of calls would probably mandate that large cities maintain a magistrate
exclusively for the issuance of TSWs. The required use of TSWs would also increase the
time officers would spend at the scene of the intended search, reducing the number of of-
ficers available to answer other calls.
80. The constitutional protections inherent in the use of search warrants include: the
intervention of a neutral and detached magistrate, the "freezing" of an officer's probable
cause statement prior to the search, and specificity concerning the focus of the search and its
location.
81. Although "It]he search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building," Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973), quotedin Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974), the Fourth Amendment does protect searches of automobiles.
82. Justice Harlan espoused this argument in his dissent in Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970). See notes 104-06 and accompanying text infra.
83. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). Note that the burden of proof of valid consent is on the prosecution.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). For a discussion of when one may
validly consent to the search of another's property, see 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
691-759 (1978).
and was not "the product of duress or coercion, express or implied."84
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined not by any single
factor, but rather by the totality of the circumstances. 5 It should be
noted that "[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse to consent is one
factor to be taken into acount, the government need not establish such
knowledge as the sine qua non of effective consent."86
It has been argued that consent to search is not voluntary if it is
given in response to a threat of immobilization for an indefinite period
of time, such as that required for the procurement of a TSW. The
Ninth Circuit, however, has held to the contrary. In United States v.
Agosto,87 the defendants were told that if they did not consent to an
immediate search of their premises, the premises would be put under
guard until a warrant could be obtained. The court, in looking at the
totality of the circumstances, found that such a statement by police did
not negate voluntariness as a matter of law.88 In fact, in a California
case where the defendant was given a similar choice, the court held that
this "was tantamount to advising the defendant that he had a right to
refuse consent. 8
9
The voluntariness of the consent becomes a more important issue
as the defendant's surroundings at the time of the consent become less
familiar. "The psychological atmosphere in which the consent is ob-
tained is a critical factor in the determination of voluntariness . . .
[and] the court must be aware of the 'vulnerable subjective state' of the
defendant .. -90 Therefore, while a suspect may take some comfort
in being in his own vehicle, when he is stopped late at night on a lonely,
dark, and infrequently traveled road, it may be argued that his consent
to search is not the result of a voluntary decision, but is rather a prod-
uct of his strange and oppressive surroundings. This was the situation
84. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
85. Among the factors bearing on the validity of consent are: claim of authority; show
of force by police and other coercive surroundings; a threat to seek or obtain a search war-
rant; prior illegal police action; the consentor's maturity, sophistication, mental or emotional
state; prior or subsequent refusal of consent; a confession or other cooperation; consentor's
denial of guilt; the giving of Miranda warnings; right to counsel; "implied" consent by en-
gaging in certain activities; deception as to police identity; and deception as to police pur-
pose. For a general discussion of these factors, see 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 83, at 636-90.
Note also that "[w]hether defendant intended to give his consent is not determinative"
where the officer reasonably interpreted defendant's words and actions as granting consent.
People v. Wheeler, 43 Cal. App. 3d 898, 903, 118 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (1974). But cf., Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, holding that a mere expression of acquiesence may not be
enough to sustain a finding of voluntary consent. Id at 548-49.
86. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
87. 502 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. Id at 614.
89. People v. Gurtenstein, 69 Cal. App. 3d 441, 451, 138 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166 (1977).
90. United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229).
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in United States v. Walling,91 where the court held that the defendant's
consent to a search of the trunk of his automobile was voluntary. It
may follow from Walling that in any automobile stop and search situa-
tion consent in the face of a threat of indefinite immobilization will be
found to be voluntary and therefore effective.
4. The Chambers Stationhouse Search
In 1970, the Supreme Court extended the scope of warrantless au-
tomobile searches, effectively dispensing with the requirement that exi-
gent circumstances exist at the time of the search. In Chambers v.
Afaroney,92 the Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile
after it had been removed to the stationhouse and was being held there
under police control. Though the exigencies involved in an automobile
stop and search situation do not continue after the automobile has been
removed to the police station, the Chambers Court nevertheless based
their endorsement of the warrantless stationhouse search on the auto-
mobile exception.
The Court chronicled the development of the automobile excep-
tion since Carroll v. United States,93 noting that courts had consistently
upheld automobile searches in circumstances where a warrantless
search of a home or office would not have been justified.9 4 The distinc-
tion between buildings and vehicles was necessary, because "the cir-
cumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for
particular articles are most often unforseeable; moreover, the opportu-
nity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable"95 and can be
driven out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. "This is strikingly true where the automobile's owner is alerted
to police intentions and, as a consequence, the motivation to remove
evidence from official grasp is heightened." 96
The inherent mobility of automobiles alone did not provide a suf-
ficient basis for the Chambers opinion, because the car was under po-
lice control at the time of its search.9 7 However, since a warrantless
search of the car would have been constitutionally permissible if con-
ducted at the scene of the stop, and since it was not unreasonble under
the circumstances to remove the car to the stationhouse,98 the Court
91. 486 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1973).
92. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
93. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
94. 399 U.S. at 48-51.
95. Id at 50-51.
96. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 590.
97. The Chambers Court held that the stationhouse search was too far removed in time
and place from the defendant's arrest to be justified as a search incident to arrest. 399 U.S.
at 47.
98. "All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the
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held that police did not lose their right to search the automobile with-
out a warrant when they first transported it to the stationhouse.99 The
Court reasoned that the exigency inherent in the mobility of an auto-
mobile exists even after the car has been removed to the stationhouse.
The Court found only the retention of the car while the warrant was
being sought to have been an unconstitutional infringement of the
rights of the car owner."
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judg-
ment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted un-
til a search warrant is obtained; arguably, the "lesser" intrusion is
permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But
which is the "greater" and which is the "lesser" intrusion is itself
a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of
circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a war-
rant."°
Thus, the Chambers majority, unwilling to determine whether im-
mediate search or indefinite seizure poses the greater intrusion upon
constitutional rights, equated the two, allowing either course to be fol-
lowed. Moreover, since the exigency present at the scene was found to
retain its full force after the vehicle was removed to the stationhouse,
the Chambers majority found the later search to be constitutionally in-
distinguishable from an indefinite seizure for the procurement of a
search warrant. 0 2 In other words, "the existence of exigent circum-
stances is to be determined as of the time of the seizure rather than the
time of the search,"'10 3 and a warrantless stationhouse search is permis-
sible regardless of the lapse of time which arguably attenuates any exi-
gency.
In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan dissented from the Chambers
majority's "lesser-greater non-distinction." Justice Harlan felt it was
"clear that a warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth
Amendment values."'0 5 Also, Harlan believed that the choice of
night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers,
and it would serve the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the vehicle and
the keys together at the stationhouse." Id at 52 n.10.
99. This section will not discuss inventory searches, as these searches are routine listings
of personal property and need no exigency or probable cause to validate them.
100. 399 U.S. at 52.
101. Id at 51-52.
102. Id at 52.
103. United States v. Collins, 549 F.2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 431 U.S. 940
(1977).
104. Justice Harlan's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, begins at 399
U.S. 55.
105. Id at 63.
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whether the vehicle should be immediately searched or held until a
warrant could be obtained should be left to the vehicle's occupants.
The occupants could consent to an immediate search, thus avoiding
any delay, or insist that their privacy interest be protected by the inter-
vention of a neutral magistrate. 0 6 Justice Harlan's argument appears
to be the most reasonable solution to the lesser-greater problem. Cer-
tainly personal rights are afforded greater protection by allowing the
individual suspect to choose which of his rights is to be infringed.
When the Court allows the police to make this choice, it effectively
dispenses with the search warrant requirement in automobile search
situations. Faced with the choice, the officers are certain to prefer the
more expedient alternative and conduct a warrantless search.
Had the Chambers Court decided that the immobilization of the
automobile pending the procurement of a warrant entailed the lesser
infringement of personal rights, warrantless searches of automobiles
based on exigency would have been effectively halted. In the words of
one commentator:
If the police have authority to make warrantless seizure of the
automobile and maintain custody pending issuance of a warrant,
and if one views such activity as a "lesser" violation of the
Fourth Amendment, under what theory could an immediate
search on the highway ever be justified? In other words, most
automobile cases involve a seizure followed by a search. In the
theory advanced, exigencies might justify warrantless seizures,
but never could justify warrantless searches.0 7
It can hardly be doubted that the Court wished to avoid so drastic
a result as the virtual elimination of the Carroll Doctrine from the ex-
ceptions to the search warrant requirement. Instead, the Court ensured
Carroll's continued validity by refusing to draw a lesser-greater distinc-
tion. As a result, whenever exigency exists at the time of an automobile
stop,'0 8 the police do not need a warrant to search, regardless of how
attenuated the exigency has become. 0 9
The continued vitality of the Carroll Doctrine as expanded by the
Chambers decision is evidenced by a 1975 per curiam opinion in which
106. Id at 64. See notes 82-91 and accompanying text supra.
107. Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances,
31 OKLA. L. REV. 110, 131 (1978).
108. "The rationale of Chambers is that gien a justified initial intrusion, there is little
difference between a search on the open highway and a later search at the station." Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 n.20 (1971). Thus, if the officer could not have
searched initially, he may not search later by relying on Chambers.
109. Even if enough time passes between seizure and search, during which a warrant
could have been obtained, this alone would not invalidate the search. "The exigency may
arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not
negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action." Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 595-96.
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the Court upheld another warrantless stationhouse search of an auto-
mobile. The case, Texas v. W9hite," 0 involved a search of the defend-
ant's car after it had been driven by an officer to the stationhouse where
the defendant had refused consent to search. In reaching its decision,
the Court cited Chambers, holding that "[t]here, as here, '[t]he probable
cause factor' that developed at the scene 'still obtained at the sta-tionhouse.' "1 I
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,"' countered the ma-
jority opinion in a strong dissent, arguing that the case was factually
distinguishable from Chambers, and that Chambers should not be ex-
tended beyond its facts. The dissent distinguished Chambers by finding
that in that case the circumstances justified the removal of the car to the
stationhouse prior to the search, 3 while the police officers lacked any
apparent justification for the warrantless removal of the defendant's car
in Texas v. W*hite." 4
The seizure and removal of the car here were not for the pur-
pose of immobilizing the car until a warrant could be secured,
nor were they for the purpose of facilitating a safe and thorough
search of the car. In the absence of any other justification, I
would hold the seizure of petitioner's car unlawful and exclude
the evidence seized in the subsequent search."'
The majority apparently expands the allowable grounds for re-
moving a vehicle to the police station prior to a warrantless search.
The first California case to apply Chambers to an on-the-scene
search was People v. Laursen."6 In Laursen, the defendant abandoned
his car at the scene of an attempted armed robbery and commandeered
another vehicle for the getaway. Police at the scene of the crime imme-
110. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
Ill. Id at68.
112. Id at 69.
113. For an outline of the circumstances present in Chambers, see note 98 supra.
114. "In this case, the arrest took place at 1:30 in the afternoon, and there is no indication
that an immediate search would have been either impractical or unsafe for the arresting
officers. . . . Since, then, there was no apparent justification for the warrantless removal of
respondent's car, it is clear that this is a different case from Chambers." 423 U.S. at 70
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id at 72. Commentators have also questioned the rationale used by the majority in
Texas v. White. "One could quarrel not so much with the result but with the careless non
sequitur that supported it. The key issue in the Chambers extension of Carroll was not
whether the probable cause still obtained at the stationhouse. . . , but rather whether the
exigency 'still obtained at the stationhouse.' The Chambers battle was fought over that ele-
ment of the doctrine, not over the element of probable cause." Moylan, The Automobile
Exception." What It Is And What It Is Not-A Rationale In Search OfA Clearer Label 27
MERCER L. REV. 987, 1011 (1976).
116. 8 Cal. 3d 192, 501 P.2d 1145, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972). Prior to Laursen, Chambers
was applied to an air freight search. People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
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diately searched the passenger compartment of the car for evidence of
the defendant's identity, but because they did not have the tools neces-
sary to gain access to the trunk, they impounded the car and subse-
quently made a warrantless search of the trunk at the impound garage.
In upholding the warrantless search, the Court, citing Chambers, first
stated that "there is no distinction of constitutional proportion between
an immediate search on probable cause without a warrant and the au-
tomobile's immobilization until one is secured."" 7 The court then held
that the impounding of the vehicle was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 18 Having justified the impounding of the car, the court could
find "no inconvenience or invasion of defendant's rights which further
infringed any constitutional prohibition by the fact that the vehicle was
removed from the scene of the crime to an impound garage beyond that
which would have resulted had a warrant authorizing the impound and
search first been obtained.""1 9 Thus, the California courts have
adopted Chambers where the impounding of the vehicle is found to
have been reasonable.
a. The TSW and the Stationhouse Search
It is interesting to speculate whether Chambers and its progeny
would have reached theisame conclusion had TSWs been available at
the time those cases were decided. The Chambers majority did state
that "which is the 'greater' and which is the 'lesser' intrusion. . . may
depend on a variety of circumstances."'120 Certainly one of these cir-
cumstances, and indeed a very forceful circumstance, is the duration of
the car's immobilization. Now that this duration can be significantly
reduced through the use of TSW,121 the degree of infringement of one's
constitutional rights can be correspondingly diminished. Thus, the
minimization of the period of immobilization, coupled with the desira-
bility of an independent judgment by a magistrate, may very well jus-
tify a reconsideration of Chambers, favoring the temporary seizure over
a warrantless search.122 In any event, the availability of TSWs
strengthens the logical appeal of Harlan's dissent in Chambers,23 and
117. 8 Cal. 3d at 201, 501 P.2d at 1151, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
118. Id at 202, 501 P.2d at 1151, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
119. Id
120. 399 U.S. at 51-52.
121. See note 10 supra.
122. In his dissenting opinion in Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 69 (1975), Justice Marshall
stated that "the basic premise of Chambers'conclusion that seizures pending the seeking of a
warrant are not constitutionally preferred to warrantless searches was that temp orary seizures
are themselves intrusive." Id at 71-72 (emphasis added). Thus, Marshall believes the dura-
tion of the seizure is not critical. Later in his argument, Marshall stated "Chambers took
such time elements out of the equation. . . 'equating' the intrusiveness of a search and a
relatively brief seizure." Id at 72 n.*, (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
123. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
impairs the continued validity of the "lesser-greater non-distinc-
tion." 124
5. Privacy Considerations
Although the Chambers Court stressed the mobility of the auto-
mobile as the grounds for the car/home distinction, later cases have
focused on the difference in an individual's expectation of privacy in
the car and the home. 12  In its plurality opinion in Cardwell v.
Lewis, 126 the Court stated that "the exercise of a desire to be mobile
does not, of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion. But insofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends
to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our
inquiry.' 12
7
The difference between one's expectation of privacy in their car,
on the one hand, and their person or building, on the other, 28 led the
Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 2 9 to conclude that "[t]he
search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a build-
ing.' 30 But it is not clear why a lesser privacy interest in one's car
should justify a lesser standard of constitutional protection. The real
issue is whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's automo-
bile is significant enough to be afforded constitutional protection, not
whether this privacy interest equals the privacy interest in one's home.
Courts have repeatedly held that the reasonable expection of pri-
vacy in an automobile is insufficient to protect the vehicle from war-
rantless government intrusion. "One has a lesser expectation of privacy
in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thor-
oughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view."' 13 1 In addition, "[a]utomobiles are consistently left with casual
124. See id at 51.
125. The Chambers opinion merely mentioned privacy considerations. "[T]his Court
[does not] require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto
even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a war-
rant affords." 399 U.S. at 50.
126. 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (warrantless stationhouse search of the exterior of a car).
127. Id at 591.
128. In a literal sense, one's expectation of privacy is immaterial, since privacy protection
stems from rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Subjectively, the degree of pri-
vacy protection one expects may well be greater or less than that which one is entitled to by
right. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 382-
88 (1974).
129. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
130. Id at 279.
131. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1973).
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bailees who have complete control over the car for extended periods of
time;" 132 they periodically undergo official investigation and are often
taken into police custody in the interests of public safety.
133
This is not to say that automobiles have no protection under the
Fourth Amendment, indeed, a search under the Fourth Amendment,
even of an automobile, is a serious invasion of privacy' and the of-
ficers must have probable cause before they can lawfully search a sus-
pect's car. Also, as previously noted, 35 "there is a recognized and
protectible privacy interest in concealed areas of a car' 136 and absent
consent, officers must have specific probable cause with respect to these
areas before searching them without a warrant. 37 These areas do not,
however, enjoy the degree of protection extended to a house or office,
although perhaps they should.138
As modem society has become increasingly more dependent on
the automobile, the car has evolved into much more than a mere vehi-
cle for transportation. It is closer to being a "repository for personal
effects,"' 139 taking on some of the same functions, and therefore privacy
expectations, that apply to homes. 14" Although the validity of the dis-
tinction between the reasonable expectation of privacy in one's car and
132. Comment, Aftermath of Cooper v. California, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 401, 410.
133. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
134. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
135. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
136. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 571, 547 P.2d 417, 426, 128 Cal. Rptr.
641, 650.
137. For a discussion of consent, see notes 83-91 and accompanying text supra.
138. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, the Court held that, absent another exception
to the search warrant requirement, homes and offices could only be subject to a warrantless
search when the search is incident to a lawful arrest, and the scope is limited to the area
within the arrestee's immediate control. Since concealed areas of cars enjoy greater privacy
protection than exposed areas of cars, why should the concealed areas of one's car receive
any less protection than one's office, especially when the car is in police custody? The re-
quirement of a search warrant would offer these concealed areas added protection in accord-
ance with the actual expectation of privacy held therein.
It should also be noted that in a recent case, the Supreme Court decided that passengers
of an automobile lacked standing to challenge a warrantless search of the car in which they
were riding since (1) they asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the car
searched, nor an interest in the property seized, and (2) they failed to show that they had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). Thus, the status as a mere invitee does not alone assure a passenger of Fourth
Amendment protections. See also Pollard v. State, 388 N.E. 2d 496, 502-03 (Ind. 1979).
139. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590.
140. See Jesmore, Toward the Preservation ofPersonalPrivacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
723, 737 n.85 (1977). As to whether self-contained mobile homes are more like cars than
homes in regards to the owner's expectation of privacy, see United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d
582 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court sustained the warrantless search of a mobile home,
relying on Carroll and Chambers.
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in one's home has been widely accepted, it may be argued that this
distinction has lost its validity.
a. The TSW and Privacy Considerations
The shift in emphasis from mobility to privacy considerations
broadens the scope of permissible warrantless searches. Under the for-
mer analysis, as extended by Chambers, the mobility of the automobile
at the time of the stop was deemed to continue, justifying a later war-
rantless search at the stationhouse. The legality of this later search was
dependent upon a "variety of circumstances,"'' including the duration
of the delay required for the acquisition of the search warrant. Thus,
the rapid availability of TSWs may affect the determination of "which
is the 'greater' and which the 'lesser' intrusion." 142
However, under the expectation of privacy analysis, the inquiry
involves the determination of one threshhold issue: is the expectation
of privacy in the place to be searched sufficiently great so that probable
cause alone will not justify a warrantless intrusion.
Because the privacy analysis involves this threshold issue, rather
than a balancing test, the impact of the availability of TSWs on the
analysis is less apparent than under the mobility rationale. Where the
privacy interests involved are insufficient to mandate the procurement
of a traditional search warrant, the increased accessibility of the TSW
may be irrelevant. But if this threshold issue is broken down into its
own balancing test, the TSW's advantages become evident.
While the privacy analysis has never incorporated a true balancing
test, in certain areas it has resembled a sliding scale, ranging from the
unprotected areas in plain view to areas, such as one's home, which
receive the maximum protection. In addition, the delay and inconve-
nience to police activities inherent in the acquisition of a search war-
rant, to a certain degree, have been "balanced" against the privacy
interests, and a line drawn allowing warrantless searches in some areas
but not in others. The introduction of the TSW into this equation
should produce a different result. Just as "[t]he search of an automo-
bile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment than the search of one's person or of a building,"' 43 the
acquisition of a TSW is far less burdensome than the acquisition of a
traditional search warrant. Once the inconvenience inherent in ob-
taining a warrant is diminished, the sides of the equation must be re-
balanced, and the range of protected privacy interests must be in-
creased accordingly. The expedience and convenience of the TSW
141. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
142. Id at 51.
143. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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should result in the elimination of warrantless searches in all areas en-
joying even minimal privacy expectations.
B. The Plain View Doctrine
As a general proposition, it is fair to say that when a law enforce-
ment officer is able to detect something by utilization of one or
more of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point
where those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'"
The plain view exception to the search warrant requirement was
formally promulgated by Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire.'4 5 Recognizing that "[it is well established that under certain
circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant,"'' 4 6 Stewart set out to delimit the parameters of the doctrine.
He defined three necessary conditions for a valid plain view seizure:
prior valid intrusion, inadvertent discovery, and evidence which is im-
mediately apparent as such.
"What the plain view cases have in common is that the police of-
ficer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion. .. .
This justification serves as the threshold element of plain view analysis;
if not satisfied, the search cannot be condoned under plain view ration-
ale. The Coolidge opinion listed four examples of prior valid intru-
sions: intrusions pursuant to a warrant to search for other items,
intrusions pursuant to a valid warrantless search for other items, intru-
sions due to a search incident to arrest, and valid intrusions where the
officer had not intended a search. 4 These illustrations were not in-
tended by the Court to be exhaustive, but rather were meant to serve as
examples of prior valid intrusions.
The existence of a prior valid justification for entry preserves con-
stitutionally protected privacy interests. Since the officer must be law-
fully at his vantage point in order for the plain view doctrine to apply,
items within his purview are, by definition, beyond one's reasonable
expectation of privacy, and therefore may be seized without violating
privacy rights.'" 9 Also, because only items left in open view may be
seized, this doctrine does not allow "general, exploratory rummaging in
a person's belongings."' 50
144. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 240 (1978).
145. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
146. Id at 465.
147. Id at 466.
148. "[T]he plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminat-
ing object." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466.
149. See note 129 supra.
150. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467.
1054
The second condition precedent to a valid plain view seizure re-
quired in some jurisdictions, but not in California,' 5 ' is inadvertence.
The Coolidge opinion, recalling the standard of Trupiano v. United
States,15 2 reasoned that so long as the plain view doctrine does not
validate general searches, "it would often be a needless inconve-
nience" 153 to require police to procure a warrant covering an inadver-
tent discovery. "But where the discovery is anticipated, where the
police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize
it. . . . [t]he requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconve-
nience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable
,,154
Coolidge also described the type of things which may be seized
under the plain view rationale:
Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.' 55
a. The TSW and Plain View Searches
Although the Coolidge opinion does not set forth precisely how
"immediately apparent" the evidence must be, courts have generally
applied a standard of probable cause. In a statement typical of the
general trend, the Supreme Court of Alabama articulated the standard:
"[flor an item in plain view to be validly seized, the officer must possess
some judgment at the time that the object to be seized is contraband
and that judgment must be grounded upon probable cause."'' 56
Although the plain view exception appears to be a logical solution
to the dilemma of inadvertently discovered evidence, it is beyond ques-
tion that constitutional rights would be better protected through the use
of a search warrant. In Coolidge, Justice Stewart was influenced by his
belief that "the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an in-
advertant discovery is great."' 57 Since this inconvenience is considera-
bly reduced by the use of TSWs, it may be time to abandon the plain
view exception in favor of the use of TSWs whenever practicable.
151. Since this portion of the Coolidge decision was joined by only four justices (Stewart,
Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) some jurisdictions, including California, have rejected
this requirement. See North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (1972).
152. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
153. 403 U.S. 468.
154. Id at 470.
155. Id at 466.
156. Shipman v. State, 291 Ala. 484, 488, 282 So. 2d 700, 704 (1973). Accord, People v.
Murray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 305, 143 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1978).
157. 403 U.S. at 470.
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The advantages of a TSW over a warrantless plain view seizure
stem from the weaknesses inherent in the plain view doctrine. First,
the inadvertent nature of the discovery loses much of its importance
when a TSW is used. The inadvertence requirement exists due to the
fear that police will utilize the plain view doctrine to circumvent search
warrant requirements when they anticipate what evidence will be left
in plain view.158 If an officer is required to obtain the approval of a
magistrate prior to seizing even plain view evidence, much of the moti-
vation to fabricate inadvertence disappears. Nevertheless, there will be
occasions when an officer, suspecting the presence of contraband at a
certain premises, but lacking sufficient probable cause to justify the is-
suance of a warrant, may attempt to engineer a "prior valid intrusion"
to gain admittance and effectuate a cursory search, hoping to spot the
contraband in plain view."' Once contraband in plain view is spotted,
of course, the officers have sufficient probable cause for the acquisition
of a warrant. It is doubtful that the availability of TSWs will solve this
problem; indeed, it is likely that this practice can only be checked
through internal enforcement of policies set by the police department
itself. But abandonment of the plain view doctrine in favor of TSWs
would result in shifting the responsibility for the initial determination
of the evidentiary value of the items seized from the officer on the scene
to a neutral and detached magistrate. That a magistrate's judgment is
preferred over that of an officer involved in the case is beyond ques-
tion;' 60 the use of TSWs would thus operate as an effective check on
illegal seizures. The fact that this check would preclude seizure of the
item is another of the advantages of using the TSW, for mere exclusion
of evidence at trial often does not remedy the invasion of privacy in-
volved in its seizure and impoundment. While the privacy invasion
and inconvenience involved in a plain view seizure is sometimes mini-
mal, in other instances the interference can be considerable. In North v.
Superior Court, 61 for example, the California Supreme Court allowed
the plain view seizure of an autoniobile, because it was parked on a
public street and was evidence of a kidnapping. In a case such as this, a
TSW could have been obtained prior to the automobile's seizure with
minimal, if any, danger to effective law enforcement. Certainly the
property rights of the vehicle's owner would have been better protected
had the probable cause for its seizure been tested by an impartial mag-
istrate prior to its impoundment. The other advantages of seizures pur-
158.. Id at 470-71.
159. Police officers are often accused of this practice. A typical example is the timing of
the execution of an arrest warrant so as to apprehend the suspect in his home, since, given
the valid intrusion to arrest, the plain view doctrine supersedes one's reasonable expectation
of privacy.
160. See note 13 supra.
161. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
suant to search warrants over warrantless seizures '62-including the
"freezing" of the officer's probable cause statement and the presumed
sufficiency of probable cause-also counsel reevaluation of the plain
view doctrine in light of the new TSW procedure.
C. Search Incident to Arrest
Under the Carroll-Chambers rule, searches of automobiles are
based in part on the existence of probable cause to search. The Court
also allows warrantless searches where there is probable cause to ar-
rest. 1
63
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
affect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.
64
The history of search incident to arrest has been one of "remarka-
ble instability,"'165 characterized by constant shifting of constitutional
standards. 66 The current scope of the search incident to arrest was
partially delineated in Preston v. United States,167 a case involving the
warrantless stationhouse search of defendant's automobile. In Preston,
162. See note 80 supra.
163. The Carroll Court distinguished the right to search from the right to arrest: "[tihe
right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They
are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of
the automobile offend against the law." 267 U.S. at 158-59. Similarly, the California
Supreme Court ruled that "[i]t follows that probable cause to arrest a traffic offender, no
matter how persuasive, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a warrantless
search of his vehicle for contraband. To justify that search, there must be indepefident prob-
able cause to believe the vehicle does in fact contain contraband." People v. Superior Court
(Kiefer), 3 Cal. 3d 807, 815, 478 P.2d 449, 453, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1970).
164. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
165. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
166. This history is chronicled in Chime, 395 U.S. at 755-60. The important cases in the
development include: Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (recognizing a traditional
right to search the person of the accused); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(upon arrest, whatever is found on one's person or in his control may be seized as evidence);
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (upholding officer's right to contemporane-
ously search the place of arrest); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(193 1) (warrantless search of an arrestee's office unlawful where no crime had been commit-
ted in the officer's presence and search warrant could have been obtained); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (sustaining extensive warrantless search of four-room apartment
after occupant had been taken into custody pursuant to an arrest warrant); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) (right to search incident to arrest "grows out of the
inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest" and that "there must be some-
thing more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest"); Rabinowitz v. United
States, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (the test "is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable.").
167. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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the Court refused to uphold such a search as incident to arrest because
of its remoteness in time and place from the actual arrest. 168 "Once an
accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another
place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."' 169
The leading case on the present status of searches incident to ar-
rests is Chimel v. Cai~fornia.170 There, officers appeared at the defend-
ant's house with a warrant for his arrest and waited there for his return.
Upon arriving home, the defendant was arrested, after which the police
thoroughly searched the entire house, including the attic, garage, and a
small worksh6p. The search lasted approximately one hour. The
Court excluded the fruits of this search, restricting the permissible
scope of the search incident to the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. A broader search could have violated the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment rights and could not have been justified in the absence of
another exception to the search warrant requirement.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endan-
gered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its conceal-
ment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol"--construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence. 171
In justifying a search incident to arrest, all that need be shown is (1)
that the person searched was lawfully arrested and (2) that the scope of
the search was limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate con-
168. For a similar California holding, see Mestas v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 537, 498
P.2d 977, 102 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1972).
169. 376 U.S. at 367.
170. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
171. Id at 762-63. The Court also held, that although Harris and Rabinowitz could be
factually distinguished from the case at bar, the rationale supporting them would justify the
search conducted in Chimel, and therefore the two cases had to be overruled. "Rabinowitz
and Harris have been the subject of critical commentary for many years, and have been
relied upon less and less in our decisions. It is time, for the reasons we have stated, to hold
that on their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with
those that we have endorsed today, they are not longer to be followed." Id at 768.
trol.172 A separate showing of exigency is unnecessary, as exigency is
assumed to flow from the arrest.
The limitations on searches incident to arrests apply not only to
the time, place and scope of the warrantless search, but also to the
items which may be the focus of the search:
It is now settled that as an incident to a lawful arrest, a warrant-
less search limited both as to time and place. may be
made (1) for instrumentalities used to commit the crime, the
fruits of the crime, and other evidence thereof which will aid in
the apprehension or conviction of the criminal; (2) for articles the
possession of which is itself unlawful, such as contraband or
goods known to be stolen; and (3) for weapons which can be used
to assault the arresting officer or to effect an escape. 17
3
1. The TSW and Search Incident to 4rrest
In applying the Chimel line of reasoning to automobile searches, it
becomes apparent that the limits of such a search will often be nar-
rower than those associated with the Carroll Doctrine. While the
search of an automobile pursuant to a finding of probable cause to ar-
rest-an exigent situation by definition-is limited as to time, place,
and scope, a Carroll search is limited only in scope. Thus, while a war-
rantless stationhouse search of an automobile is too remote in time and
place to be incidental to the arrest, the search may withstand Fourth
Amendment scrutiny under the Carroll-Chambers rule. One reason for
this apparent inconsistency is the difference in rationale for the two
search warrant exceptions; under the search incident to arrest analysis,
a warrantless search is legitimated by the mobility of the arrestee-
once safely in custody, access to any weapons or evidence in the auto-
mobile is precluded. Under the Carroll-Chambers analysis, however,
the mobility of the automobile justifies the warrantless search, and con-
finement of the arrestee does not preclude access to the automobile by
172. The search for items on the person of the arrestee is subject to different limitations
under federal and California law. Federal courts allow full-body searches of the suspect
whenever he is to be taken into custody, and permit the arresting officer to search for evi-
dence as well as weapons. The fact that the suspect is arrested is itself justification for a full-
body search and the officer need not point to any subjective fear that the suspect is armed or
dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260 (1973). California courts require a more exacting standard and vary the per-
missible extent of the search of an arrestee according to the stage of detention involved.
When the suspect is merely stopped and not taken into custody, "a pat-down search for
weapons ... must be predicated on probable cause for believing that a weapon is secreted
on the [arrestee]." People v. Superior Court (Simon) 7 Cal. 3d 186, 206, 496 P.2d 1205, 101
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
173. People v. Superior Court (Kiefer), 3 Cal. 3d 807, 812-13, 478 P.2d 449, 451, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 731 (1970) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). The Robinson Court allowed the inspec-
tion of a crumpled cigarette package found on the person of the defendant.
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others. However, as noted in the discussion of Chambers and its prog-
eny, the rapid availability of TSWs mitigates the mobility problems
associated with automobiles, and it is certainly arguable that the effec-
tive use of TSWs should result in the placing of time, place and scope
restrictions on warrantless stationhouse searches of automobiles also.
Since the TSW allows an officer to obtain a warrant without considera-
ble delay, the burden imposed on policemen, by requiring them to se-
cure the car until they can obtain a warrant, is dramatically lessened by
the TSW. Thus, just as removal of the arrestee from the vicinity of the
automobile precludes a search of the automobile as incident to arrest,
the removal of the car to a police garage should preclude a finding of
exigency. Indeed, it appears that all but the most urgent automobile
searches would lose their true "exigent" status with the enactment of
TSW statutes, and therefore, such a search should be subjected to time,
place and scope restrictions.
The availability of the TSW does not affect the scope of a search
incident to an arrest as limited by Chimel. In fact, it was because of the
Chime! decision that TSWs were developed to allow officers on the
scene to obtain the necessary warrant and exceed the Chimel restric-
tions. But the availability of TSWs should also result in extension of
the Chimel limitations to all non-consensual warrantless searches, in-
cluding those of automobiles.
Conclusion
The TSW represents a long-needed tool for effective law enforce-
ment. When used to its full potential, it enables officers to obtain
prompt advance judicial approval of searches, thereby minimizing the
threat of exclusion of evidence at trial. At the same time, the use of the
TSW ensures the maximum protection of Fourth Amendment rights,
especially in areas previously enjoying only minimal safeguards. Un-
fortunately, however, much of the potential benefit of the TSW re-
mains unrealized, and absent a judicial mandate requiring their use,
this situation is unlikely to change.
As illustrated in the preceding sections, much of the justification
for warrantless automobile searches loses its validity in the face of the
rapid availability of the TSW. The TSW provides a viable alternative
to the warrantless Carroll search; it suggests the means of drawing the
Chambers lesser-greater distinction and it affords greater protection to
one's right to privacy, at a minimal cost to law enforcement efficiency.
Indeed, the TSW was designed to create a practical and expedient
method of search warrant acquisition. Now that this procedure exists,
exceptions to the search warrant requirement should be re-drawn to
reflect its potential impact on Fourth Amendment protections.
